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Abstract
Aim of study: This paper determines the preferences for debt or equity ‒ common stock and self-financing ‒ that are shown by agri-food 
companies to finance innovation investment strategies and identify the monitoring role that third-party funding providers can play.
Area of study: A sample of 41,109 Spanish SMEs (364,020 observations).
Material and methods: The information was obtained from the SABI database, using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator and a logistic regression like contrast methodologies.
Main results: Spanish agri-food companies undertake innovation projects by financing these investments through owners’ resour-
ces, mainly from current common stock, as they are independent of these companies’ capacity to generate internal funds. This may be 
conditioned by the problems of severe negative self-financing presented by this sector in Spain which make it difficult to use retained 
earnings as a source of financing for new investments; 30% of these firms have a negative self-financing level of EUR 100,000 as the 
losses accumulated by economic activity are higher than the reserves provided.
Research highlights: Agri-food companies prefer to use owners’ funds to finance innovation projects which allows them to maintain the 
concentration of power, a decision that is reinforced by the limitation to credit access due to innovation creates intangible assets that are not 
usually accepted as collateral by financial institutions. Meanwhile, given the particularities of these companies ‒ instability and liquidity 
problems due to the need for funds of operations ‒ the recourse to debt is an appropriate control mechanism to prevent overinvestment 
decisions. 
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Introduction
The agri-food industry accounts for the main 
activity of the manufacturing sector in several 
countries (Hirsch & Hartmann, 2014), and the in-
vestment strategies of this industry are crucial to 
increase competitiveness, boost job creation and 
overcome the social challenges of territories (i.e., 
FoodDrinkEurope, 2019; MAPAMA, 2019). The 
issues that justify the need for new investment relate 
to the barriers that exporting firms operating in this 
sector sometimes face due to their pollution behaviour 
(Zhuang & Moore, 2015), the need to comply with 
the requirements of food security protection laws, the 
growing competition from emerging market firms that 
are able to produce agri-food products at more compe-
titive prices, and major changes in lifestyles over re-
cent decades, which have drastically altered consumer 
behaviour (Costa & Jongen, 2006; Rama, 2008; Alar-
cón & Arias, 2018; García-Sánchez et al., 2021).
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One of the main challenges that affects this sector is 
the need to adopt new technologies that support innova-
tion in processes and products to increase production and 
in turn achieve sustainable economic growth (Huang et 
al., 2010). This is vital to assure the long-term success of 
firms (Boehlje et al., 2011) and to avoid relying exclusi-
vely on public support (Kirchmann & Thorvaldsson, 2000; 
Esposti, 2011; Malone & Chambers, 2017), although ac-
cess to public funding is one of the main drivers of inno-
vation efforts (Alarcón & Arias, 2018). 
Despite the current importance of biotechnology, the 
agri-food sector has traditionally been considered to be 
a non-intensive sector in R&D (Connor & Schiek, 1997; 
García-Martínez & Briz, 2000) as these companies gene-
rally innovate in processes (Archibugi et al., 1991), appl-
ying new technologies from other sectors, so innovation 
usually occurs through investments in capital and equip-
ment. When innovating in products, the changes are usually 
progressive rather than radical to avoid customer aversion 
to new agri-food products (Galizzi & Venturini, 2008).
These innovation activities are predominantly found in 
larger companies, with greater experience in the industry 
and better access to knowledge (García-Alvarez-Coque et 
al., 2014). However, other research highlights the inno-
vation capacity of SMEs thanks to their greater flexibility 
and adaptability to changes (Bayona et al., 2001; Marave-
lakis et al., 2006; Alarcón & Sánchez, 2013). Neverthe-
less, there is no empirical evidence regarding the role that 
the financial and capital structure plays in these business 
decisions of agri-food companies (Calderón et al., 2007; 
González-Moralejo, 2008; Gardó et al., 2009; Capitanio 
et al., 2010; Lin, 2012).
The capital structure is determined by the combination 
of the different resources used by a company to finance its 
investments: equity (which includes common stock and 
self-financing associated with the retained earnings) and 
indebtedness. For small companies that are normally ma-
naged by their owners, according to Hutchinson’s (1995) 
arguments, the adequacy of the financial and capital struc-
ture determines their investment policies and business 
success. Hutchinson argues that these companies show an 
aversion to increase common stock that may lead to the 
entry of new owners, as it dilutes the power of the current 
owners and debt contracting involves the monitoring of 
the company by financial institutions.
However, the limitations that some companies pla-
ce on raising common stock from funds provided by 
the current owners cannot be overlooked and may lead 
to the self-generation of internal funds to finance policy 
investment projects becoming more appropriate for their 
interests. Since the self-financing generated by these 
companies is often not sufficient to meet the necessary 
investment needs, it is necessary to resort to financial in-
debtedness. In addition, these companies use third-party 
financing to meet the financial needs associated with the 
operating cycle. All of this means that these companies 
are often characterised by access to third-party financing 
with short-term maturity that requires continued renego-
tiation (Scherr & Hulburt, 2001).
In this regard, our proposal aims to analyse, in re-
lation to innovation strategies, the advantages and di-
sadvantages associated with the capital structure (the 
preference for the use of equity over external funding) 
as well as the corrective role that the financial structu-
re can perform, in addition to the traditional prism as-
sociated with the type of financing used (the quality of 
debt associated with maturity) and the need for funds of 
operations arising from the operating cycle (claimants 
operating debt). Furthermore, we observe whether the-
se control mechanisms help to mitigate informational 
asymmetries, making investment in innovation more 
efficient (Cutillas & Sánchez, 2014). In this sense, whi-
le innovation can be seen in times of crisis as a way to 
survive the market and maintain or improve competiti-
veness in other scenarios, the OECD (2012) shows that 
the most innovative companies have been affected by a 
collapse of the consumption of their ‘new’ products and 
must address these uncertainties, perhaps as a result of 
overinvestment policies.
This research contributes to the existing literature by 
presenting empirical evidence on the effect of the capital 
structure and debt on innovation investment in the context 
of an industry (agri-food) and a country (Spain) where 
approximately 30% of agri-food companies have a nega-
tive self-financing level of EUR 100,000 as the losses ac-
cumulated through their economic activity. This situation 
is particularly serious for 55% of these companies because 
they are in an unstable situation, presenting negative net 
worth. Unstable companies are micro-enterprises that have 
an inadequate capital structure as a result of the reduced 
common stock, EUR 32,860. The rest of the companies 
with negative self-financing are in a stable position resul-
ting from the common stock amounting to EUR 375,886.
In addition, 86% of agri-food companies have liquidity 
problems, having to resort to third-party financing to satis-
fy the obligations arising from the operating cycle. Accor-
dingly, 58.43% of companies with liquidity problems are 
over-indebted, with low-quality or short-term debt. On the 
other hand, 4.46% of companies without liquidity problems 
experience over-indebtedness to undertake expansion stra-
tegies. In addition, agri-food companies have a very low 
average economic return (1.7%), because the margin on sa-
les is negative (-0.2%) which is indicative of a non-optimal 
cost structure, and an asset rotation of 2,055.
In this context, agri-food companies prefer to use equi-
ty to finance innovation projects, mainly through current 
common stock, due to the problems of negative self-finan-
cing that characterise this industry. This situation is ag-
gravated by liquidity problems due to the need for funds 
of operations, and all of this leads companies to access 
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external financing in the short term. This financial structure 
mitigates overinvestment. In addition, and contrary to the 
theoretical hypotheses, we contrast the idea that the capital 
structure is also a useful mechanism to control underinvest-
ment, which is characteristic of SMEs. This effect is also 
relevant due to the nature of this industry’s operations and 
that it traditionally has little predisposition to be innovative. 
These results differ according to the business size and the 
agri-food subsector in which the company operates.
Material and methods 
Sample and data resources
The information used was obtained from SABI by 
downloading the Balance Sheets and the Income State-
ments as of 31 December in the financial years 2008 to 
2017 of companies engaged in the agri-food sector. SABI is 
a database of Bureau van Dijk that contains the accounting 
information of all Spanish firms that deposit their annual 
statement in the registry according several business laws.
We downloaded information from 159 CNAE tree-di-
git-codes and grouped them into four activities according 
to ICEX (2017). As can be seen in Fig. 1, the agri-food 
system comprises the activities of the primary sectors 
(agriculture and livestock) and processing industry as 
the first links of the agri-food chain, and there is a strong 
relationship with suppliers and services. The distribution 
companies (transport and wholesale) and those responsi-
ble for the retail marketing of products and the provision 
of catering services are the final link in the chain, establi-
shing the direct link with the final consumer.
The time period was selected according to the standard 
of uniformity of the accounting information contained in 
the financial statements used in the analysis. Thus, becau-
se the current accounting regulations, the PGC (Spanish 
General Accounting Plan), were implemented in 2008, 
this date determines the beginning of the study period as 
the annual accounts of previous years are not homoge-
neous in terms of masses heritage. The completion year 
of 2017 stems from it being the last year with information 
available as of the date of data download.
The population corresponds to 2,600,000 Spanish com-
panies for which financial data are available in the SABI. 
In the first phase of selection, the 224,050 companies in 
the agri-food sector that appeared in the database during 
the period 2008–2017 were identified. Subsequently, infor-
mation was downloaded from active agri-food firms, com-
panies that had a total asset and net amount of sales figure 
different from 0 in 1 of the years analysed. The observa-
tions for which some measures had missing values were 
then deleted, and those with extreme values for the varia-
bles of interest (i.e., outliers) were also removed. In addi-
tion, companies for which their CNAE code was not availa-
ble were deleted. After this process, the sample comprised 
490,856 observations from 45,196 Spanish companies in 
the agri-food sector for the period 2008–2017.
The information for each company was required to re-
fer to a minimum of three consecutive years to have a data 
panel with reduced analysis bias resulting from the busi-
ness turbulence associated with the onset and extinction of 
companies in the period under investigation. In addition, the 
requirement of three years is associated with the need for 
a minimum period of time to control for unobservable hete-
rogeneity and correct endogeneity problems in the analyses. 
Thus, the final sample contains 41,109 companies (364,020 
observations), forming a panel of companies that is not com-
plete (unbalanced panel) in the sense that the information is 
not available for all the companies in all the years analysed.
Research hypothesis 
Innovation promotes greater productivity and com-
petitiveness, but making such investments requires an 
adequate financing policy. Previous scholars posit that 
R&D investment is negatively (positively) associated 
with leverage (the capital structure) because innovation 
creates primarily intangible assets that are not good 
collateral (Simerly & Li, 2000). In the agri-food sector, the 
effect of the financial structure on innovation is realised by 







Figure 1. Phases of the agri-food system
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taking an indirect approximation of the indebtedness effect 
associated with business size. Thus, some authors find that 
the larger the business size, the greater the degree of inno-
vation due to better access to human capital and financial 
resources (Karantininis et al., 2010; Bayona et al., 2013; 
Hirch et al., 2013). However, other work highlights the in-
novation capacity of SMEs thanks to their greater flexibili-
ty and adaptability to changes (Bayona et al., 2001; Mara-
velakis et al., 2006; Alarcón & Sánchez, 2013).
In this sense, our proposal aims to analyse the advan-
tages and disadvantages associated with the financial and 
capital structure for the innovation strategies of agri-food 
companies. In this regard, various theories about capital 
structure are proposed in the literature and numerous stu-
dies try to analyse the factors that determine companies’ 
level of indebtedness (Pindado et al., 2011, 2017). Howe-
ver, there is insufficient evidence regarding the effects that 
indebtedness has on other business dimensions, such as 
the degree of innovation. 
Among the main corporate capital structure theories, 
the pecking order theory and trade-off theory are the most 
common. According to the first theory (Myers & Majluf, 
1984), companies that need to undertake new investments 
are turning firstly to self-financing, secondly to debt and 
thirdly to common stock. Financial preferences have 
been observed in several papers (i.e., O’ Brien, 2003; 
Capizzi et al., 2011; Bartolini, 2013), although other au-
thors (i.e., Hall, 1992; Vicente-Lorente, 2001; Hsu et al., 
2014) evidenced a negative impact of debt in R&D invest-
ment given the high risk associated to an intangible project, 
what causes that creditors apply higher borrowing costs 
(Capizzi et al., 2011; Bartoloni, 2013). 
In addition, the second of the theories indicates that, to un-
derstand the capital structure of companies, other issues must 
be considered. For example, on the one hand, indebtedness 
has tax advantages in reducing the payment of taxes. On the 
other hand, a high level of indebtedness can lead to financial 
insolvency proceedings. For these reasons, the static balan-
cing theory proposes that there is an optimal level of indebted-
ness to which companies aspire (de Miguel & Pindado, 2001).
For SMEs, which are normally managed by their ow-
ners, according to Hutchinson’s arguments (1995), the 
adequacy of the financial and capital structure in relation 
to investment policies is more complex. On one hand, 
firms avoid using debt contracting due to this option in-
volving the monitoring of the company by financial ins-
titutions. On the other hand, these corporations show an 
aversion to increasing the current common stock that may 
lead to the entry of new owners, as it dilutes the power of 
the current owners. Therefore, taking into account the fact 
that SMEs could present important limitations on increa-
sing equity from funds provided by the current owners, 
1  For a more complex financial analysis of Spanish agri-food systems, see García-Sánchez (2021).
they can lead to the self-generation of internal funds be-
coming the policy for financing investment projects that 
are more suited to their interests (De Massis et al., 2018).
Empirically, previous papers note that corporate in-
vestment in physical capital depends to a large extent 
on the capacity to generate internal funds or self-finan-
cing (Pindado & de la Torre, 2009; Pindado et al., 2011) 
and the self-financing capacity by SMEs is usually not 
sufficient to meet the necessary investment funds, so it 
is fundamental to enjoy a good level of current common 
stock to undertake innovation projects due to (i) the dis-
cretion arising from the use of owners’ funds is greater in 
the face of the reissuing of accounts to lenders and (ii) the 
intangible nature and high risk of investments in innova-
tion that provoke restrictions in the access to finance. In 
this regard, we establish the first hypothesis of the paper:
H1: Spanish agri-food companies will use equity ‒ 
current common stocks and self-financing ‒ to under-
take innovation projects.
In addition, following García-Sánchez & García-Meca 
(2018), it is necessary to take into account the efficiency of 
innovations investment as less able managers could overin-
vest (implement projects with a negative NET) or underin-
vest (reject projects with a positive NET). These decisions, 
according to agency theory, could be corrected by the pre-
sence of debt in the capital structure as banks are speciali-
sed institutions in the supervision of borrowers (Petersen & 
Rajan, 1994). Therefore, debt could be a discipline or con-
trol mechanism aimed at a more efficient use of financial 
resources as a consequence of the effects associated with 
the risk of bankruptcy in highly leveraged firms and the 
higher control over the discretionary use of cash flow that 
guides companies to only finance investment opportunities 
with positive net present value (Singh & Davidson, 2003).
Spanish businesses1  are characterised by presenting fi-
nancial leverage close to 60% (Cutillas & Sánchez, 2014) 
and 76% of these external funds expire in the short term, 
so the quality of the indebtedness is quite low (CES-CyL, 
2018). However, in line with the previous agency argu-
ments, the shortening of the debt maturity allows for more 
comprehensive control over management decisions, as it 
requires continuous renegotiation and may lead to changes 
in the initial conditions of debt contracts. In other words, 
short-term debt use will help to control underinvestment 
and overinvestment, as it allows greater financial flexibility 
for borrowers and greater control by lenders (Cutillas & 
Sánchez, 2014). Therefore, we posit our second hypothesis:
H2: Spanish agri-food companies with a finan-
cial structure characterised by a larger volume of 
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short-term debt will undertake more efficient innova-
tion projects.
Moreover, we have mentioned that Spanish businesses 
present serious liquidity problems arising from the need 
for funds of operation (NOF) being higher than the wor-
king capital (Baños et al., 2016) and resort to the use of 
short-term debt as a source of current asset financing due 
to the difficulty in obtaining long-term financing (Peters et 
al., 2013). This is because the payment terms for suppliers 
and creditors are longer than the expiration of receivables. 
These NOFs will adversely affect innovation strategies in 
the agri-food sector, leading to underinvestment because 
funds cannot be allocated to profitable projects when used 
in the financing of current assets. In addition, underinvest-
ment is a severe problem for small companies (MacMa-
hon, 2003) due to the concentration of decision making 
and monitoring of the owner figure, a duality that makes it 
difficult to consider different points of view and involves 
less specialisation (Danielson & Scott, 2007). Therefore, 
we establish the last hypothesis of the paper:
H3: Spanish agri-food companies with liquidity pro-
blems underinvest in innovation.
Models and econometric procedures
To test the proposed hypotheses, the following analy-
sis models were proposed in which the independent va-
riables are ‘Leverage’ in Model 1 and ‘CommonStock’, 
‘Self-financing’, ‘Debt_Maturity’ and ‘Liquidity_Pro-
blem’ in Model 2. Model 1 was designed to evaluate the 
first hypothesis, H1, concerning the effect of the capital 
structure on the investment in innovation projects and the 
investment efficiency. Model 2 aimed to test the validity 
of H2 and H3, deepening the analysis of H1.
[Model 1]
 [Model 2]
where the notational term INV is expressed by two diffe-
rent dependent variables, ‘Investment’ and ‘Optimal_In-
vestment’, i identifies company 1 to company 41,109, t 
takes values for the years 2008 to 2017, β represents the 
coefficients to estimate, η, represents unobservable hete-
rogeneity, and μ the error term. The definitions of varia-
bles are listed in Table S1 [suppl.].
Regression models were proposed to take into account 
dependency techniques for panel data and methodolo-
gies that strengthen the power and explanatory capacity 
as well as the consistency, which are all associated with 
the period analysed; to control the specific characteristics 
of each company that remains unchanged in the period 
analysed or unobservable heterogeneity; and to facilitate 
a dynamic study of companies and reduce the aggrega-
tion bias that arises when time series analyses are used to 
characterise the behaviour of individuals. Specifically, for 
the variable ‘Investment’, we used the two-stage dynamic 
estimator proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991), based 
on the generalised method of moments. For the ‘Opti-
mal_Investment’ variable, due to its dichotomist nature, 
we employed a logit regression. In both regressions, we 
employed two lags for the independent variables to avoid 
endogeneity problems as previous papers have evidenced 
in the management and business field. These lags refer to 
the instrumental variables introduced in the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) procedure and the inclusion 
of independent variables in t-2 in logistic regression. To 
avoid any pattern of multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation within panel regression models, the 
robust command is used for the GMM estimator. For lo-
gistic regression, we required that the eigenvalues would 
be close to 0, indicating that the predictors are highly 
intercorrelated. 
The goodness of fit of the logistic regressions was 
determined by the Log-Likelihood and the Wald test of 
the joint significance of the coefficients obtained, distri-
buted asymptotically as χ2 under the null hypothesis of 
no relation. In addition to the Wald test for GMM, we 
estimate two serial correlation tests of order i that use 
first-difference residuals, distributed asymptotically as N 
(0.1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation and 
the Hansen test of over-identification restrictions, distri-
buted asymptotically as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between the instruments and the error term.
The first variable of analysis is ‘Investment’, which, 
following Biddle et al. (2009), is defined as the sum of 
investment in innovation in capital goods and other in-
tangible assets minus cash from sales of similar elements, 
multiplied by 100 and scaled by the total assets. Second, 
we proposed an abnormal investment proxy, Optimal_
Investment, which is obtained from the residuals of a 
firm-specific deviation from optimal investment, calcula-
ted by estimating an industry–year model of investments 
as a function of growth opportunities (as measured by the 
INVi,t+1 = β0 +  β1Leveragei,t + β2Sizei,t +
β3ROAi,t+β4GrowthOpportunitiesI,t +
β5AgeI,t + β6CashI,t+ β7LossI,t+ β8InventoryI,t
+ β9Subsectori + β10Yeart + β11Crisist + ηi + μit
INVi,t+1= β0 + β1CommonStocki,t  
+ β2Self-financingi,t + β3Debt_Maturityi,t
+ β4Liquidity_Problemi,t +β5Sizei,t
+ β6ROAi,t+ β7Growth_Opportunityi,t 
+ β8Agei,t + β9Cashi,t + β10Lossi,t
+ β11Inventoryi,t +β12Subsectori +β13Yeart
+ β14Crisist + ηi + μit
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percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t). The 
model is described as follows:
Investmenti,t+1 = β1SalesGrowthi,t + μit          [Model 3]
However, the previous measure could not be conside-
red as a dependent variable due to this residual identifying 
different deviations (negative and positive) from the op-
timal investment, so we ranked this measure in quartiles 
and rescaled the quartile rankings from 0 to 4. Firm–year 
observations in the middle quartile are considered to be 
the optimal investment. Firm–year observations in the 
bottom quartile (e.g., the most negative residuals) are 
classified as underinvestment. Observations in the top 
quartile (i.e., the most positive residuals) are classified as 
overinvestment.
The independent variable ‘Leverage’ of Model 1 re-
presents the capital structure and is measured using the 
ratio total debt to total assets. It is recommended that it 
should be between 0.5 and 0.6, reflecting a balance in the 
use of equity and liabilities in the financing of the econo-
mic structure. The breakdown of this variable in Model 
2 entails the incorporation of the independent variable 
‘Debt_Maturity’, determined as the degree of short-term 
enforceability of the debt and measured using the current 
to total liabilities ratio. Its value must be between 0 and 
0.5, indicating that the maturity of most of the debt is long 
term, while, if the value is greater than 0.5 and close to 
1, all debts are enforceable in less than a year. To repre-
sent the volume of equity, we incorporated the variables 
‘CommonStock’ and ‘Self-financing’, measured as the lo-
garithm of common stock and the accumulated retained 
earnings, respectively, relativised by the total assets. ‘Li-
quidity_Problem’ is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if the company has liquidity problems, 0 otherwise. It is 
determined by the negative difference between the wor-
king capital (current assets minus current liabilities) and 
the need for funds of operations or NOF (Stocks + Recei-
vables + Operating Treasury – Spontaneous Liabilities). If 
the working capital is lower than the NOF, it implies that 
the company does not have sufficient liquidity to meet its 
operational needs and has to resort to external financing 
to meet the payment of obligations for commercial ope-
rations. In the other case, the company is meeting its ope-
rational needs without resorting to other financing as well 
as enjoying financing through operating debts that do not 
usually involve explicit costs.
Finally, a series of control variables were included 
to avoid biased results based on previous studies (Gar-
cía-Sánchez & García-Meca, 2018): ‘Size’, the logarithm 
of total assets; ‘ROA’ or economic profitability; ‘Grow-
th_Opportunities’ determined as the year-on-year varia-
tion in sales over the period; ‘Age’, the logarithm of the 
age of the company; ‘Cash’, the standard deviation of the 
cash flows from t-2 to t; ‘Loss’, a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the ordinary result before extraordi-
nary income and expenses is negative and 0 otherwise; 
and ‘Inventory’, the duration of the operating cycle. In 
addition, we control the subsectors, the time period and 
the time of crisis. For the first two variables, we used ca-
tegorical measures that represent the four activities in the 
agri-food industry and each year in the period 2008–2017. 
The crisis variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if 
t=2008 to t=2012, 0 otherwise.
Results
Agri-food systems in numbers: Descriptive 
statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the va-
riables used in the analysis. The analysis of the capital 
structure of the companies, Panel A, allowed us to iden-
tify 20% of agri-food companies as being in an unstable 
position, presenting negative net worth as a result of the 
losses arising from their economic activity. In addition, 
among the companies with a stable position, 16.26% have 
a negative self-financing level of approximately EUR 
100,000. Looking more closely at Panel B, we can say 
that the difference between companies with an unstable 
position and companies with a stable position with nega-
tive self-financing is a capital structure problem arising 
from the reduced common stock. 
In Panel C, it can be noted that the annual investment 
rate relative to the total assets is 3.70%. This investment is 
optimal for 41.13% of companies in the agri-food sector, 
while 37.31% of these companies overinvest and 21.56% 
underinvest. On average, agri-food companies have high 
financial leverage (0.722). Regarding debt maturity, about 
73% of the payable liability expires in the short term, in-
dicating a low debt quality given the proximity of matu-
rity in stable and unstable situations. For a more complex 
financial analysis of Spanish agri-food systems, see Gar-
cía-Sánchez (2021).
Capital structure and innovation investment
Table 2 presents the results obtained for the proposed 
Models 1 and 2 to test the research hypotheses. In relation 
to the variable ‘Leverage’, it can be observed that it is not 
significant in the estimated model for innovation invest-
ment (coeff. = – 0.00457; p = 0.252), showing a negative 
significant effect in the level of efficiency of innovation 
investment (coeff. = – 0.017; p = 0.000). These results 
indicate that companies with a smaller volume of equity 
(higher leverage) undertake less optimal innovation pro-
jects because they underinvest and do not earmark funds 
for investments with a positive NET.
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A = E;  L = 0
Stability
A = E + L
The company´s assets (A) is fully financed with its 
equity (E); there are no liabilities (L).
The company is financed with indebtedness and equi-
ty at different levels.
Instability 20.041% 16.14%
Equivocal position
A = L;  E = 0
The company is fully financed by debt. 0.001% 0.00%
Unstable or abnormal position
A + E = L
Indebtedness is higher than the assets. 20.04% 16.14%
Maximum instability
E = L;  A = 0
The company has no assets and is entirely indebted.
Panel B. Descriptive for current common stock and self-financing according to the balance position
Stability Stability with negative self-financing Instability
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2008-2017
CommonStock 184.419 566.056 375.886 822.517 32.680 173.017
Self-financing 321.874 964.849 -94.334 -193.455 -114.470 -170.651
2007
CommonStock 189.527 575.266 447.327 898.224 32.697 170.208
Self-financing 381.853 1034.013 -111.152 -211.094 -115.969 -177.361
Panel C. Descriptive numerical variables
Magnitudes/rates
Global Stability Instability
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Investment 0.370 0.297 0.365 0.294 0.389 0.307
Leverage 0.722 0.359 0.594 0.276 1.231 0.126
Debt_Maturity 0.733 0.294 0.734 0.292 0.727 0.302
CommonStock -2.802 1.621 -2.784 1.648 -2.873 1.503
Self-Financing -1.685 1.299 -1.685 1.299 0.000 0.000
NOF 4.250 1.744 4.466 1.694 3.220 1.610
Size 5.640 1.583 5.860 1.556 4.760 1.369
ROA 0.017 0.105 0.028 0.094 -0.026 0.133
Growth_Opportunities 0.033 0.228 0.037 0.225 0.018 0.238
Age 2.318 0.823 2.359 0.818 2.156 0.824
Cash 0.087 0.098 0.088 0.966 0.080 0.101
Inventory 4.656 2.209 4.758 2.200 4.244 2.196






Optimal_Investment 41.13% 42.16% 36.99%
OverInvestment 37.31% 37.25% 37.56%
Underinvestment 21.56% 20.58% 25.45%
Liquidity_Problem 86.48% 84.18% 95.64%
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the Spanish agri-food industry. SD: standard deviation
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Investment Optimal_Investment











Size 0.0490*** 0.192*** 0.0942*** 0.115***
(0.00634) (0.0140) (0.00454) (0.00600)
ROA -0.00271*** -0.000992 0.0122*** 0.0223**
(0.000641) (0.00223) (0.00299) (0.00893)
Growth_Opportunities 1.95e-06 1.77e-05 -0.786*** -0.965***
(1.99e-05) (1.84e-05) (0.0122) (0.0167)
Age -0.0168*** -0.0266*** 0.511*** 0.501***
(0.00281) (0.00410) (0.00874) (0.0109)
Cash -0.196*** -0.178*** -0.0394*** -0.0797***
(0.00394) (0.00472) (0.0149) (0.0190)
Loss -0.0292*** -0.0280*** -0.523*** -0.526***
(0.00777) (0.00924) (0.0109) (0.0145)
Inventory -0.0225*** -0.0192*** -0.136*** -0.158***
(0.00104) (0.00123) (0.00298) (0.00385)
Subsector 0.000 -0.00575*** 0.284*** 0.0414***
(0.000) (0.000418) (0.00559) (0.00426)
Year -0.0042*** 0.000 0.0361*** 0.294***
(0.000344) (0.000) (0.00348) (0.00681)
Crisis -0.000379 -0.00159** 0.0886*** 0.117***
(0.000646) (0.000761) (0.0175) (0.0217)
Constant 0.000 0.000 -74.52*** -85.19***
(0.000) (0.000) (-7.005) (8.573)
Log-Likelihood -177886.0 -119490.67
Wald-test (Logistic) 14526.52*** 10056.34***




m1 is the first-order serial correlation test in the difference residual, distributed asymptotically as N (0.1) under the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation; m2 is the second-order serial correlation test in the difference residual, distributed 
asymptotically as N (0.1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation; Hansen is a test of over-identification restrictions, 
distributed asymptotically as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. * p < 
0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 2. Dependency models for the analysis of the capital structure and innovation in the agri-food sector. Models include the 
coefficients and standard error in brackets.
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To deepen the analysis of the capital structure with 
which companies in the agri-food industry prefer to un-
dertake innovation projects, in Model 2 we can see that 
a greater volume of companies’ common stock leads to 
higher investment rates in innovation projects (‘Com-
monStock’ in ‘Investment’: coeff. = 0.127; p = 0.000) and 
selecting these projects efficiently (‘CommonStock’ in 
‘Optimal_Investment’: coeff = 0.0257; p = 0.000). Howe-
ver, the accumulated retained earnings by the company, 
the variable ‘Self-financing’, are not significant in any of 
the estimated models (‘Investment’: coeff. = 0.000519; 
p = 0.739; ‘Optimal_Investment’: coeff. = 0.00538; p = 
0.337). The results obtained for the ‘Investment’ variable 
confirm the arguments of our first hypothesis, regarding 
the preference of smaller companies to use their own re-
sources for the financing of innovation projects. However, 
the provenance of these resources affects the efficiency of 
the ongoing investment differently. In this sense, the agri-
food companies with the largest contributions of funds 
from their owners undertake more efficient innovation in-
vestments, correcting the trend towards underinvestment 
that characterises smaller companies and that take place 
for 21.56% of the companies in our sample (MacMahon, 
2003). Conversely, the self-financing of innovation pro-
jects with accumulated retained earnings has no effect on 
the level of investment efficiency, perhaps as a result of 
the accumulated losses in this sector.
With regard to the H2 scenario, concerning the moni-
toring role that the maturity of the financing from others 
may play in underinvestment and overinvestment deci-
sions, it can be observed in this regard that, although it 
reduces the monetary amount earmarked for innovation 
(coeff. = – 0.0777; p = 0.000), it leads to optimal invest-
ments (coeff. = 0.167; p = 0.000), avoiding overinvest-
ment. These results confirm our H2 scenario regarding 
the role of monitoring debt maturity in decisions that are 
made in a concentrated manner in small businesses, con-
cretely, discretionary decisions in projects with a negative 
NET that affect 37.31% of our sample.
Regarding the H3 scenario, contrary to what was ex-
pected, we note that companies with higher needs for 
funds of operations undertake more efficient investments 
(coeff. = 0.113; p = 0.000), allocating more funds to in-
novation projects (coeff. = 0.0271; p = 0.000). Therefore, 
we reject the proposed H3 scenario in which we expected 
liquidity-challenged companies to take underinvestment 
innovation decisions.
Regarding the control variables, the results show that 
the largest agri-food companies allocate more funds to 
innovation projects, selecting them efficiently. The most 
profitable and older firms show a greater aversion to in-
novation, without leading them to underinvest. The losses 
from economic activity and the associated necessary avera-
ge inventory enhance the underinvestment in innovation in 
the agri-food sector. This situation is partially extendable to 
companies with greater opportunities for growth, which do 
not undertake the investment in innovation necessary for 
their growth status. These results partially confirm previous 
evidence from the studies by Cutillas & Sánchez (2014) 
and García-Sánchez & García-Meca (2018). 
Preferences according to subsector of activity
In this context, and unlike the approach taken in pre-
vious studies, this work considers that, in the field of agri-
food, it is necessary to differentiate between: (i) agricul-
tural crops and livestock holdings, which fall within the 
primary sector; (ii) the food-processing industry, which is 
part of the secondary sector; (iii) the wholesale distribu-
tion sector; and (iv) the retail and catering sector, which 
the tertiary sector encompasses. This differentiation is ne-
cessary because the capital structure depends on the pur-
pose and scope of the business. It is also necessary to take 
into account the power of each agent in the supply chain, 
especially that of companies in the distribution sector 
(Trebbin, 2014), as this can influence the most recommen-
ded innovation for production units in the other phases of 
the production process. 
By groups of subsectors of activity, as shown in Fig. 
2, companies that carry out commercial activities and 
services and are engaged in the retail trade of agri-food 
products and catering account for 46.51% of the agri-food 
system. This is the group of activities that has experienced 
an initial increase and the largest reduction in the number 
of companies in the last two years because the majority of 
companies in this subsector are micro-enterprises. Of the 
companies analysed, 20.41% carry out primary activities 
related to agricultural crops and livestock farms, 11.86% 
are engaged in the agri-food-processing industry or pro-
duction activities that are part of the secondary sector and 
21.23% conduct transport and distribution activities for 
agri-food products.
Table 3 summarises the results obtained for an analysis 
of subsamples based on the activity subsector in which the 
companies that configure the agri-food system operate. In 
this regard, in Panel A, it can be observed that, in relation 
to the volume of funds earmarked for innovation projects, 
the results are common to those obtained in the overall 
analysis. Meanwhile, it is apparent that, in the case of the 
tertiary sector ‒ the subsectors of wholesale distribution, 
retail trade and restoration ‒ self-financing is used to un-
dertake innovation projects. In relation to the results for 
the investment efficiency, Panel B, these are only main-
tained for the tertiary sector, lacking significance in the 
primary and production subsectors. Therefore, the capital 
structure of the primary, industrial and commercial firms 
could influence the innovation of this industry, but it is 
not a guarantee of more efficient innovation investments. 
Both effects only occur in the tertiary sector. 
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Preferences according to firms’ size
On the other hand, the results obtained for the va-
riable size generate interest in the effect of the finan-
cial and capital structure on innovation according to the 
size of agri-food companies. On average, the economic 
investment of agri-food companies is around EUR 1 
million (EUR 1,048,033) within a range of more than 
EUR 2.5 million (EUR 2,692,972). We decided to ca-
tegorise these companies into three sizes. In Fig. 3, it 
can be seen that 86.18% of agri-food businesses are 
micro-enterprises, that is, companies with fewer than 
10 workers, total assets less than or equal to EUR 1 mi-
llion and a total income of less than or equal to EUR 2 
million. SMEs ‒ companies with fewer than 50 workers, 
total asset less than or equal to 4 million and a total in-
come less than or equal to EUR 8 million ‒ account for 
12.02% and large companies for 1.80%. The sectoral 
composition dimension is constant over time for SMEs 



















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Agriculture & Livestock Food-processing
Transport & Distribution Retail and Catering
Figure 2. Distribution of observations by subsectors
Agriculture & Livestock Food-processing Transport & Distribution Retail and Catering
Panel A. Results para Investment
CommonStock 0.06259*** 0.07194*** 0.067484*** 0.10356***
(0.01778) (0.01850) (0.01459) (0.02055)
Self-Financing 0.00353 0.00174 0.00608*** 0.003715**
(0.00258) (0.00372) (0.00146) (0.001826)
Debt_Maturity -0.0709*** -0.0831*** -0.15285*** -0.05580***
(0.01100) (0.01659) (0.01292) (0.00909)
Liquidity_Prob. 0.0257*** 0.03431*** 0.01671*** 0.029433***
(0.00424) (0.00641) (0.00345) (0.003169)
Panel B. Results for Optimal Investment
CommonStock -0.00220 0.021654 0.03464*** 0.023638***
(0.00890) (0.015498) (0.011148) (0.007814)
Self-Financing 0.01073 0.024304 0.000344 -0.007932
(0.01142) (0.01788) (0.01264) (0.007947)
Debt_Maturity -0.00101 0.10579 0.30945*** 0.29301***
(0.04466) (0.07480) (0.05814) (0.033652)
Liquidity_Prob. 0.06611* 0.03432 0.15989*** 0.08892***
(0.03564) (0.06015) (0.03928) (0.027046)
* p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 3. Dependency models for the analysis of the capital structure and innovation in the agri-food sector: Complementary 
analysis I at the subsector level. Models include the coefficients and standard error in brackets.
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micro-enterprises is increasing, particularly between 
2008 and 2010, in 2016 and 2017 they experienced a 
significant decline in the number of micro-enterprises 
to levels close to those in 2008. This decline must be 
associated with the demise of these companies because 
it does not translate into increments in other categories 
of business size.
Table 4 presents the results obtained for the subsam-
ples based on firm size that make up the agri-food sys-
tem. In this regard, in Panel A, it can be observed that, 
in relation to the volume of funds earmarked for innova-
tion projects, the results are similar to those obtained in 
the global analysis for micro-enterprises and SMEs. It is 
apparent that, in the case of large companies, the financial 
and capital structure has no statistically significant effect 
on the decision to undertake innovation projects. In rela-
tion to the results for the investment efficiency, shown in 
Panel B, these are only maintained for micro-enterprises, 
presenting divergences in the role of liquidity and self-fi-























2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Micro-enterprises SMEs Larger  firms
Figure 3. Distribution of observations by size
Micro-enterprises SMEs Larger firms
Panel A. Results for Investment
CommonStock 0.15443*** 0.03346*** 0.00228
(0.01713) (0.01183) (0.1003)
Self-Financing 0.00105 0.005296 0.001536
(0.001624) (0.003504) (0.00366)
Debt_Maturity -0.08753*** -0.09368*** -0.036155
(0.00675) (0.013982) (0.02898)
Liquidity_Pro. 0.029913*** 0.017597*** 0.008516
(0.002467) (0.003871) (0.006693)
Panel B. Results for Optimal_Investment
CommonStock 0.021558*** 0.028232*** 0.071755*
(0.005745) (0.010255) (0.03878)
Self-Financing -0.002299 0.042904*** 0.17025**
(0.005947) (0.015716) (0.06655)
Debt_Maturity 0.12422*** 0.11784* 1.53398***
(0.02503) (0.065075) (0.29854)
Liquidity_Pro. 0.122281*** 0.036126 0.07702
(0.020176) (0.04431) (0.17457)
* p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Table 4. Dependency models for the analysis of the capital structure and innovation in the agri-food sector: 
Complementary analysis II by firms size. Models include the coefficients and standard error in brackets.
12 Isabel-María García-Sánchez
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research June 2021 • Volume 19 • Issue 2 • e0104
Discussion
Empirically, we found evidence that the Spanish agri-
food system has a structure based on micro-enterprises, 
companies with fewer than 10 workers, total assets less 
than or equal to EUR 1 million and total income less 
than or equal to EUR 2 million, representing 86.18% of 
agri-food businesses. SMEs, companies that quadruple 
these numbers and have between 10 and 50 employees, 
account for 12.02%. Companies that exceed the latter fi-
gures, classified as large companies, account for 1.80%. 
By sector of activity, 46.51% of the agri-food industry is 
engaged in retail trade of agri-food products and catering, 
21.23% in distribution activities of agri-food products, 
20.41% in primary activities related to agricultural crops 
and livestock farms and 11.86% in the agri-food proces-
sing industry or production activities that are part of the 
secondary sector. 
Spanish agri-food companies undertake innovation 
projects by financing these investments through their own 
resources, mainly from common stock from the owners, 
independent of these companies’ capacity to generate in-
ternal funds. This may be conditioned by the problems 
of severe negative self-financing presented by this sector 
in Spain ‒ 30% of agri-food companies have a negative 
self-financing level of EUR 100,000 due to the losses ac-
cumulated by economic activity ‒ making it difficult to 
use accumulated retained earnings as a source of finan-
cing for new investments. However, this financial situa-
tion leads to common stock determining the level of effi-
ciency of investments in innovation.
In addition, the previous situation causes these compa-
nies to resort to third-party financing, conditioning access 
to debt with short-term maturity that requires continued 
renegotiation. The financing characteristics of others lead 
to the investment in innovation undertaken by agri-food 
companies being more efficient, correcting overinvest-
ment decisions. In addition, liquidity problems in meeting 
their operational needs characterise 86% of the agri-food 
companies that make up our sample, reinforcing the disci-
plinary role of financing from others. 
From a theoretical point of view, this paper confirms 
that agri-food companies have implemented innovation 
investment strategies to increase the quality of their pro-
ducts and the efficiency of their production processes, be-
nefiting from the flexibility and adaptability to changes 
that small companies possess (i.e., Bayona et al., 2001; 
Maravelakis et al., 2006; Alarcón & Sánchez, 2013). Al-
though in line with papers such as those by García-Al-
varez-Coque et al. (2014), these innovation projects are 
more significant as the size of companies increases. In 
addition, this research expands the empirical evidence 
contrasting the effect that the capital and financial struc-
ture has on these business decisions, contributing to the 
previous literature focusing on larger companies opera-
ting in other sectors of activity with a greater focus on 
innovation (Martinez & Briz, 2000; Calderón et al., 2007; 
González-Moralejo, 2008; Gardó et al., 2009; Karantini-
nis et al., 2010; Capitanio et al., 2010; Lin, 2012; Hirch et 
al., 2013; Bayona et al., 2013).
In this sense, in accordance with Hutchinson’s (1995) 
theoretical approaches, we confirm that Spanish agri-food 
companies, characterised by a small size, undertake in-
novation projects through financing mainly from current 
common stock, which allow them to maintain the con-
centration of power with the insiders of the companies, a 
situation that is reinforced by the limitation to credit ac-
cess due to innovation creates intangible assets that are 
not usually accepted as collateral by financial institutions 
(Simerly & Li, 2000). 
Unlike the results obtained by Pindado & de la Torre 
(2009) and Pindado et al. (2011) for physical capital in-
vestments, innovation does not depend on the ability to 
generate internal funds or self-financing. This may be 
conditioned by the problems of severe negative self-fi-
nancing presented in this sector in Spain ‒ 36.26% of 
agri-food companies have a negative self-financing level 
of EUR 100,000 as the accumulated losses due to econo-
mic activity are higher than the reserves provided, ma-
king it difficult to use accumulated retained earnings as 
a source of financing for new investments. This means 
that common stock determines the level of investment 
efficiency, correcting the usual trend of small enterprises 
underinvesting (MacMahon, 2003).
The previous situation causes these companies to re-
sort to third-party financing, conditioning access to debt 
with short-term maturity that requires continued renego-
tiation (Scherr & Hulburt, 2001; Peters et al., 2013) and 
more comprehensive control over managers in that they 
can lead to changes in the initial terms of debt contracts. 
These financing characteristics of others lead to the in-
vestment in innovation undertaken by agri-food compa-
nies being more efficient, a result that is in line with the 
findings obtained by studies carried out in other contexts 
and for other typologies (i.e., Cutillas & Sánchez, 2014). 
Specifically, we note that it avoids the overinvestment that 
mainly occurs in the design of ‘new’ products due to the 
firms focus on new variants of agri-food products that are 
already being consumed by a saturated market that does 
not require any more input (OECD, 2012).
In addition, liquidity problems in meeting their ope-
rational needs characterise 86% of the agri-food compa-
nies that make up our sample, problems that Baños et al. 
(2016) reveal for other sectors of activity, reinforcing the 
disciplinary role of common stock farmers. 
Our results contribute to the previous literature by con-
firming the arguments of the static equilibrium theory that 
suggests the need for an optimal level of indebtedness. 
In this regard, we found that the advantages associated 
with the use of third-party financing as a management 
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monitoring mechanism are effective in controlling be-
haviours in small undertakings with a concentration of 
power, correcting overinvestment trends. However, more 
efficient investments that alleviate underinvestment re-
quire a capital structure based on contributions from the 
owners of these companies, especially for projects asso-
ciated with intangible assets that are not admitted as an 
endorsement by external funding providers.
From a practical point of view, the results obtained 
show the advantages of short-term debt maturity for SMEs 
as a mechanism that (i) allows the financing of funds of 
operations without harming the necessary investment to 
be undertaken and (ii) corrects over-dimension deviations 
as a result of the surveillance that financial institutions 
exercise over the firms in the annual debt renegotiation.
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